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Abstract 
Ernst Zermelo presented an argument showing that there is no set of all sets that 
are members of themselves in a letter to Edmund Husserl on April 16th of 1902, 
and so just barely anticipated the same contradiction in Betrand Russell’s letter to 
Frege from June 16th of that year. This paper traces the origins of Zermelo’s 
paradox in Husserl’s criticisms of a peculiar argument in Ernst Schroeder’s 1890 
Algebra der Logik. Frege had also criticized that argument in his 1985 “A 
Critical Elucidation of Some Points in E. Schroeder Vorlesungen über die 
Algebra der Logik”, but did not see the paradox that Zermelo found. Alonzo 
Church, in “Schroeder’s Anticipation of the Simple Theory of Types” from 1939, 
cricized Frege’s treatment of Schroeder’s views, but did not identify the connection 
with Russell’s paradox.  
Bertrand Russell wrote to Gottlob Frege on June 16th, 1902, 
saying that he had found “one point where I have encountered a 
difficulty” in reading over Grundgesetze der Arithmetik in preparation 
for publishing his own Principles of Mathematics. The difficulty is 
described as follows: 
Let w be the predicate: to be a predicate that cannot be 
predicated of itself. Can w be predicated of itself? From 
each answer its opposite follows. Therefore we must 
conclude that w is not a predicate. 
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Russell immediately follows this with what sounds like the 
different, and more familiar, problem of the class of all classes which 
do not belong to themselves, but is presented as another statement of 
the same point of difficulty: 
Likewise there is no class (as a totality) of those classes 
which, each taken as a totality, do not belong to 
themselves. From this I conclude that under certain 
circumstances a definable collection [Menge] does not 
form a totality.1 
These are in fact two different problems. The first involves the 
notion of a predicate that is or is not predicated of itself. As Frege 
pointed out immediately in his response to Russell, if one makes a 
sharp distinction between predicates that are true of individuals, and 
the (higher order) predicates that are true of those predicates, as 
Frege himself did within his theory of concepts and objects, then it 
simply won’t make sense to think of a predicate applying to itself. 
There will be no predicate “to be a predicate that is not predicated of 
itself,” and so the paradox cannot arise. In fact, at the time, Russell 
did not accept the notion that concepts would be distinguished by 
type, and only acknowledged that something of the sort might be 
necessary in Appendix B of Principles of Mathematics. This first paradox 
was the most significant for Russell.  He only formulated the second 
when he saw that related versions could be constructed for other 
theories, such as Frege’s. Frege immediately acknowledged that there 
was a problem for his system in the second paradox. 
Frege responded to Russell's letter quite quickly, with a reply 
dated June 22nd, just six days later. Frege concludes as follows: 
It seems, then, that transforming the generalization of an 
equality into an equality of courses-of-values (§9 of my 
Grundgesetze) is not always permitted, that my Rule V (§20, 
p.36) is false, and that my explanations in §31 are not 
sufficient to ensure that my combinations of signs have a 
meaning in all cases. 
______________ 
1 Van Heijenoort (1967, pp. 127-128). 
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Russell did come to the paradox by considering Cantor’s theorem 
that the set of subsets of a given set, its power set, cannot be put into 
a one-to-one correspondence with that set by considering the 
hypothesis that there is a universal set. If one follows the proof of 
Cantor’s theorem the paradoxical set of all sets that are not members 
of themselves is the set that is added in the power set of the universe. 
Russell himself, however, did not see this as a problem for Cantor’s 
set theory as much as for his own. Russell originally found the 
paradox for his own views in Principles of Mathematics, in which classes 
are represented by “class concepts”, which in fact denote the 
members of a class. The members of the class can be taken “as one” 
or “as many” and it is when we speak of a class as one that it makes 
perfect sense for it to be an instance of a class, and so the concept “is 
not predicated of itself” can perfectly well be applied to itself (as 
one), thus leading to the contradiction.  
In this paper, however, I will follow the earlier history of the 
second version of the paradox, which was anticipated by Zermelo. 
The paradox developed out of an argument of Ernst Schröder, which 
was subsequently discussed by Frege, Edmund Husserl, and it finally 
appeared in a letter from Zermelo to Husserl, although Hilbert also 
had his own version. Finding that this version of the paradox did in 
fact have a long history that preceded Russell’s letter to Frege, if 
anything, will only add to the argument that it was that first version 
that most immediately interested Russell, the problem for his own 
theory, and that he wrote to Frege only to show how a similar 
problem arose in Frege’s Grundgesetze.  
Any discussion of anticipations of the second version of the 
paradox might look like an intervention in a mathematicians’ 
Prioritätstreit (priority dispute), but it in fact leads to an interesting 
series of events in the history of logic, pieces of which are familiar, 
but which, it seems, has not been formed into a single story before. 
The most prominent claim of priority is in Ernst Zermelo’s 
famous 1908 paper “A new proof of the possibility of a well-
ordering.” Zermelo adds a footnote (numbered 9) to a mention of 
Russell's discussion of his “set-theoretic antinomy” in Principles:  
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… I had, however, discovered this antinomy myself, 
independently of Russell, and had communicated it prior 
to 1903 to Professor Hilbert among others. 
In a letter of 1903, thanking Frege for a copy of the second 
volume of his Grundgesetze with its discussion of Russell's paradox, 
Hilbert told Frege that he had heard of the paradox from Zermelo 
some years before, confirming Zermelo's claim. In fact, Hilbert had 
his own version of the contradiction, concerning the class of all 
sequences of “self-mappings'” of the numbers onto the numbers, 
using a diagonal argument to show that the set of such self-mappings 
does not exist.2 In his biography of Zermelo, Ebbinghaus claims to 
just be following the “custom” at Göttingen, where the paradox was 
attributed to Zermelo alone. (Ebbinghaus actually more closely 
follows Abraham Fraenkel's terminology and calls it the “Zermelo 
Russell paradox” in the biography.3 ) 
“Hilbert's Paradox” is similar to Zermelo's in proving that some 
set does not exist, but in his case it is a set that one would expect 
given certain standard set theoretic operations. The paradox can be 
reconstructed from notes on Hilbert's lecture from 10 July 1905.4 
Hilbert derives a contradiction by taking the set of mappings of the 
numbers into the numbers M and then using two principles of set 
theory. The first principle allows one to unite “several sets and even 
infinitely many into a union.” The other asserts that “in every case 
well-defined sets arise from well-defined sets by the self-mapping 
operation.” Thus from the set M we can formulate the set MM of all 
mappings from M into M. Hilbert then considers the set U derived 
by applying these “operations of addition and mapping an arbitrary 
number of times.” Finally, he applies the mapping principle one more 
time, to U, so F = UU. Now it would appear that F is already a subset 
of U, but, by a familiar diagonal argument based on Cantor's 
theorem, we can show that there is an element in F not in U. 
______________ 
2 Ebbinghaus (2007, pp. 45-47) and Peckhaus (2004, pp. 505-506). 
3 Ebbinghaus (2007, pp.46-47) and Fraenkel (1927). Fraenkel, perhaps the 
first to use this term in print, puts “Zermelo” in parentheses, and calls it the 
“(Zermelo) Russell” paradox once in his presentation and not again in his 
discussion. He does not give any reason for his usage.  
4 Ebbinghaus (2007, pp. 45-47). 
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Hilbert's words are not precise; in particular it isn't clear what he 
means by applying the two operations an “arbitrary number of 
times.” One guess is that he thinks of F as being the union of an 
infinite number of sets:  
MM , (MM)M , MM ∪ (MM)M , ((MM)M)M), MM ∪ (MM)M ∪ 
((MM)M)M), … 
It appears that, if we have continued this process an “arbitrary 
number of times”, then anything in UU must have been already 
included in this process and so the process yields nothing more than 
U. Of course we immediately sense that the “arbitrary” number of 
operations must pass through all the ordinals, taking a union after ω 
many iterations of M and beginning again with another process of 
either union or exponentiation for each ordinal number, and so on. 
Seen this way “Hilbert's Paradox” is a proof that there is no set of all 
ordinals. Hilbert was, reportedly, suspicious of the “philosophical” 
notions used in other versions of the paradox, such as the notion of a 
“set of all sets” or even a “set of all ordinal numbers”, and so 
preferred to limit himself to more familiar mathematical notions, 
such as mapping, or the application of an operation an “arbitrary” 
number of times. Thus, the argument can be seen, in Hilbert's way, as 
a contradiction which can be derived from two apparently ordinary 
mathematical operations, considering function spaces and taking 
unions of arbitrary collections of things already constructed. It 
doesn't point to an internal contradiction in the very notion of set or 
class. It may well be an “antinomy”, as Zermelo puts it, a real internal 
contradiction, but it is a contradiction in a theory, one which Hilbert 
held should be prevented by constructing a (provably) consistent 
axiomatic theory of sets.  
Zermelo sent a letter on April 16th, 1902, to his former teacher, 
Edmund Husserl. Husserl's notes on the letter were found among the 
papers in the Husserl archives thirty years ago.5 There, Zermelo 
reports a result that he had obtained some years before.6 The letter 
was occasioned by a review of Schröder’s Algebra der Logik (1890) that 
______________ 
5 Rang and Thomas (1981) and Ebbinghaus (2007, p. 46).  
6 See Husserl (1979 p. 399) for Husserl's notes on this letter.  
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Husserl had written in 1891.7 Schröder had presented a proof that a 
universal class, one that contains “everything conceivable”, leads to a 
contradiction. (It thus appears that Schröder joined Cantor in being 
among the first to claim that there is a concept which does not have 
an extension.) 
One primary goal of Schröder’s lectures was to promote the work 
of Charles S. Peirce “and his school” among German logicians 
(Schröder 1890, p.iii). In Lecture IV, devoted to the theory of classes, 
Schröder presents the algebraic account of classes using one primitive 
notion of “subsumption” (Subsumtion). The assertion that a class a 
subsumes a class b, symbolized as a € b which is read as “a is b” or 
“all a are b”, clearly means what we would express as “a is a subset of 
b”, symbolized as a ⊆ b.8 This logic interprets all predications to be of 
this form “a is b”, relating one class to another.  
One part of Schröder's account of sets is a rejection of Boole's 
notion of the universe of discourse, which in this framework will be the 
element 1 in the algebra of classes. The argument below is from page 
245 of Schröder (1890) as quoted by Frege: 
As we have laid down, 0 would have to be contained in 
every class that can be got out of the manifold 1; … 0 would 
have to be the subject of every predicate. Now suppose we 
took a to be the class of those classes of the manifold that are equal 
to 1 (which would certainly be permissible if we could 
bring everything thinkable into the manifold 1), then this 
class of its very nature contains just one class, viz. the 
symbol 1 itself, or alternatively the whole of the manifold, 
which constitutes the reference of the symbol; but therefore 
besides this it would contain “nothing,” i.e. 0. Hence 1 and 0 
would make up the class of the objects that are to be equal 
to 1; and so we should have to admit not only: 1 = 1 but 
also:  0 = 1. For a predicate that applies to a class -- in our 
case, the predicate: to be identically equal to 1 -- must also 
______________ 
7 See Husserl (1979 p. 36).  
8 Actually the symbol is the identity sign = with a left parenthesis 
(overwritten, but it is close enough to the readily available Euro sign to 
justify that as the symbol for any revival of interest in Schröder’s logic. 
Ernst Schroeder and Zermelo’s Anticipation of Russell’s Paradox 
  13 
apply to every individual in the class, by Principle II. 
(Frege, 1895, p.91) 
For Schröder, all predications are assertions of subsumptions, and 
in particular, the predication ‘is equal to 1’, which we would express 
as ‘x = 1’, becomes an assertion about subsumption. Given that the 
empty set, represented by 0, is subsumed by every class a, i.e. 0 € a, it 
is also subsumed by that of the things equal to 0, hence we derive 0 = 
1, a contradiction.9 This he takes to be a proof that there is no 
absolutely universal class 1. There will be sets that are not subsumed 
under 1, in particular, the empty class 0.  
Husserl charged in his review that Schröder had ignored the 
distinction between subsets (the notion of a “subordinate class”) and 
members. While it is true that the empty class 0 is a subset of every 
set, it is not a member of every set. In particular that 0 is a subset of 
the set of entities equal to 1 does not imply that it is equal to 1, the 
supposed contradiction which is derived from the assumption that 1 
is a set of all sets. Zermelo then wrote to Husserl to point out that 
“on the issue, not the method of proof, Schröder is right…”10. 
Translated from the original German Gabelsburger Stenographie 
shorthand, the notes describe the argument as follows: 
A set M, which contains each of its subsets m, m', … as 
elements, is an inconsistent set, i.e., such a set, if at all 
treated as a set, leads to contradictions.  
 
PROOF. We consider those subsets m which do not 
contain themselves as elements. 
______________ 
9 This is a charitable reconstruction. Notice that Schröder argues that the 
class of things equal to 1 includes 1 “and nothing else”, i.e., also the empty 
class (“nothing”). This sounds like Carnap’s later interpretation of what 
Heidegger says about “Das Nichts”, or “Nothing”, as something which is 
included in classes. Frege criticizes Schröder’s argument on this point  
(p.98), anticipating Carnap’s criticism of Heidegger: “If we say that the class 
a contains nothing besides the Moon, then we are denying the proposition 
that the class contains something besides the Moon; but we are not thereby 
asserting that the class contains, besides the Moon, an object with the name 
‘nothing’.”  
10 Rang and Thomas (1981, p. 16). 
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(M contains as elements each of its subsets; hence subsets 
of M will also contain certain subsets as elements, 
themselves [not] being elements, and now we consider just 
those subsets m, which may perhaps contain other subsets, 
but not themselves as elements.) 
These constitute in their totality a set M0 (i.e., the set of all 
subsets of M which do not contain themselves as 
elements), and now I prove of M0,  
 
(1) that it does not contain itself as an element, 
(2) that it contains itself as an element. 
 
Concerning (1): M0, being a subset of M, is itself an 
element of M, but not an element of M0. For otherwise, 
M0 would contain as an element a subset of M (namely, M0 
itself) which contains itself as an element, and that would 
contradict the notion of M0. 
 
Concerning (2): Hence M0 itself is a subset of M which 
does not contain itself as an element. Thus it must be an 
element of M0.
11 
So stated this is a proof that no set contains all of its own subsets 
as members. A universal set of all things, however, would certainly 
include all of its subsets as members, as those are all sets of things. 
The set M0, then, the set of all subsets of the universal set that do not 
contain themselves, will thus be simply the set of all sets that do not 
contain themselves. M0, in this case, is the Russell set. The proof that 
M0 leads to contradiction is the same argument that Russell gives, if 
M0 is a member of itself then it is not, and if it is not a member of 
itself then it is. We have the same contradiction as in Russell’s letter, 
and both, it seems, come fairly directly from applying Cantor’s 
theorem to a set of all sets (or in Zermelo’s case, a set which contains 
at least all its subsets.)  
But do we have Russell’s paradox? In fact, what we have is a 
theorem to the effect  that there is no set which contains all of its 
subsets as members. This is a theorem about sets. Indeed in another 
______________ 
11 Rang and Thomas (1981, pp. 16-17). 
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paper from 1908, “Investigations in the foundations of set theory”, 
we find it openly listed as a theorem with the following proof: 
10. Theorem. Every set M possesses at least one subset M0 
that is not an element of M. Proof. It is definite for every 
element x of M whether x ∈ x or not; the possibility that x 
∈ x is not in itself excluded by our axioms. If now M0 is 
the subset of M that, in accordance with our Axiom III 
[Zermelo's Axiom of Separation], contains all those 
elements of M for which it is not the case that x ∈ x, then 
M0 cannot be an element of M. For either M0 ∈ M0 or not. 
In the first case, M0 would contain an element x = M0 for 
which x ∈ x, and this would contradict the definition of 
M0. Thus M0 is surely not an element of M0, and in 
consequence M0, if it were an element of M, would also 
have to be an element of M0, which was just excluded. 
 Zermelo concludes the proof with this remark: 
It follows from the theorem that not all objects x of the 
domain B can be elements of one and the same set; that is, 
the domain B it is not itself a set, and this disposes of the 
Russell antinomy so far as we are concerned.12 
So Zermelo “disposes” of Russell's antinomy by presenting it as a 
theorem that a certain collection is not a set, a proof by a reductio ad 
absurdum argument.13 Burali-Forti’s proof from 1897 that the ordinals 
cannot be well-ordered was also taken as such an argument.14 If every 
______________ 
12 Van Heijenoort (1967, p. 203). 
13 In particular, there is no set that contains all of its subsets as members. 
This might sound a bit like the Axiom of Foundation, which says that there 
is no non-empty set that overlaps with every one of its members, and so 
shares a member with every one of its subsets. They are clearly very different 
claims, but do sound alike in the sense of saying that there is no set of a 
given sort. 
14 See Moore and Garciadiego (1981) for an account of how Burali-Forti's 
original theorem came to be seen as a “paradox”. It started life as a claim 
that the set of all ordinals could not be well-ordered. After Burali-Forti's 
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set can be well ordered then it follows that there is no set of ordinals. 
Indeed Zermelo's proof would seem to be also a proof related to the 
idea of “absolute infinities,” or of classes that are in some sense “too 
big” to be sets. A “set of all sets” would certainly contain all of its 
subsets as members, and so one immediate result from Zermelo's 
theorem is that there is no set of all sets. 
Zermelo considers that he has “disposed” of Russell’s paradox by 
showing it to be a simple non-existence proof, although a surprising 
one. But there is no “antinomy” in that. A proof that there is no set 
with a certain description is different from proving that nothing 
satisfies a given description, so that the set of things satisfying the 
description is empty. It is really a proof that some expression, which 
seems to refer to a set, in fact doesn't, because there is no such set. 
For every counter-example to the unrestricted comprehension 
principle, that is, a case of a predicate without a set as its extension, 
there will surely be a corresponding proof that there is no such set, 
that is, that no set that contains just the objects which satisfy that 
predicate. But there is no trivial reformulation of every non-existence 
theorem into a counter-example to the unrestricted comprehension 
principle. To think that would be to make a logical mistake. Suppose 
one thought that “there is no set y which contains all of its (y's) own 
subsets” directly provides a predicate which does not correspond 
with a set, thus a counter-instance to the unrestricted comprehension 
principle: 
∃y∀x (x ∈ y ≡ ... x ...) 
Such an instance would have to say that there exists a y such that 
any x is an element of y if and only if … what? If and only if x is a 
subset of y? That would violate the clause in the comprehension 
principle stated above which bans free occurrences of y in the 
formula … x … that determines membership in the putative set. It is 
not possible to formulate the claim that no set contains all its own 
subsets as members as a claim that there is no set of all things 
                                                                                                    
incorrect definition of the relevant notion of well-ordering was corrected, 
the result was not seen as a paradox until Russell first so presented it in 
Principles of Mathematics §301. 
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satisfying a certain formula.15 So Zermelo does indeed propose that 
Russell should be seen as only proving a non-existence theorem 
rather than as proposing a counter-example to a comprehension 
principle that was presumably implausible from the beginning. There 
might be some surprise in discovering that there is no set of all sets 
and, in fact, that no set can contain all of its subsets as members, but 
it is not clear that that should count as a “paradox.” In fact, Zermelo 
himself preferred the term “antinomy” for the result rather than 
paradox.16 He says that “paradox” means “… a statement 
contradicting the common opinion; it doesn't contain anything of the 
inner contradiction as in the case for the paradoxes of Russell and 
Burali-Forti, and expressed by the term ‘antinomy’.” On the other 
hand, that an “antinomy”, as Zermelo uses the term, can be derived 
within a formal theory is simply a proof that one of its axioms is 
incorrect and must be discarded. It doesn't mean necessarily that the 
very concepts or basic notions of a theory are at fault and lead to the 
contradiction. So far, then, it appears that while Zermelo had indeed 
anticipated the very mathematical argument that Russell later 
included in his letter, he did not see that it was a “paradox” which 
might affect several approaches to sets, including Frege’s.  
There is more to be said about Schröder’s argument, however.17 
In fact, Frege discusses the argument in his essay “A critical 
elucidation of some points in E. Schröder’s Vorlesungen über die Algebra 
der Logik” (1895). Frege begins his discussion with the quote above. 
He then continues as follows: 
On p. 246 the author shows that we can apply these 
considerations to any class b of the manifold, instead of 1, 
and thus reaches the conclusion 0 = b. 
______________ 
15 It is possible to present the proof that there is no set of all things as a 
counter-example to an instance of the comprehension principle: ∃y∀x (x ∈ y 
≡ x = x), but this can't be done for every non-existence theorem. 
16 See Peckhaus and Kahle (2002, p.158). He says this in correspondence 
with Leonard Nelson in response to a paper about the “paradoxes” of 
Russell and Burali-Forti. Peckhaus and Kahle cite a postcard to Nelson, 
postmarked 22 December 1907, in the Nelson Papers in Bonn. 
17 I am grateful to Allen Hazen who reminded me that the Church and Frege 
papers explicitly discuss Schröder’s argument. 
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This contradiction comes like a thunderbolt from a clear 
sky. How could we be prepared for anything like this in 
exact logic! Who can go surety for it that we shall not again 
suddenly encounter a contradiction as we go on? The 
possibility of such a thing points to a mistake in the 
original design. Herr Schröder derives from this the 
conclusion that the original manifold 1 must be so made 
up that, among the elements given as individuals within it, 
there are found no classes that, for their part, contain 
within themselves as individuals any elements of the same 
manifold. This expedient, as it were, belatedly gets the ship 
off the sandbank; but had she been properly steered, she 
could have kept off it altogether.  It now becomes clear 
why at the very outset, in shrewd prevision of the 
imminent danger, a certain manifold was introduced as the 
theatre of operation, although there was no reason for this 
in the pure domain-calculus.  The subsequent restriction of 
this field for our logical activities is by no means elegant. 
Whereas elsewhere logic may claim to have laws of 
unrestricted validity, we are here required to begin by 
delimiting a manifold with careful tests, and it is only then 
that we can move around inside it.  
A few lines later: 
When Herr Schröder stipulates (p. 248), as regards the 
original manifold, that among the elements given as 
‘individuals’ there shall be found no classes that, for their 
part, comprise within them as individuals any elements of 
the same manifold, he is obviously distinguishing the case 
where something is given as an individual belonging to a 
manifold or class, where something is comprised within a 
class as an individual, from the case where something is 
contained as a class within a manifold or class. Herr 
Husserl makes a similar distinction, in his review of 
Schröder’s work, between the expressions ‘a class contains 
something as an element’ and ‘a class contains something 
as a sub-class,’ and by this he tries to remove the difficulty. 
(Frege 1895, p. 92) 
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Note that Zermelo's theorem 10, that “Every set M possesses at 
least one subset M0 that is not an element of M”, in effect proves that 
one must distinguish the notions of subset ( ⊆ ) and member ( ∈ ) 
for the subsets of a given set are distinct from its members. While 
“disposing” of Russell's paradox by showing that the argument 
proves a perfectly sound theorem about sets, Zermelo’s proof also 
shows that Schröder’s conception of sets is fundamentally flawed. 
While avoiding the paradox by relying on his own axiomatic 
formulation of set theory, Zermelo also finds an important lesson 
about the nature of sets in the argument that produces the paradox. 
Frege had also carefully studied Schröder’s argument, but missed the 
consequence for his own theory. Zermelo’s argument properly 
deserves to be called an “anticipation” of Russell’s paradox and he 
discovered it by studying the very passage that Frege criticized in 
Schröder. 
Schröder’s contradictory conclusion that 0 = 1 is, of course, part 
of a reductio ad absurdum argument. Schröder does not draw the 
conclusion that every class must contain some classes that aren't 
members of that class, but rather that  every class must contain only 
classes that in turn do not contain  members of the original class. 
These will be the classes that serve as “elements” of the original class. 
Frege sees this as an ad hoc solution. It “gets the ship off the 
sandbank.”18 Frege sees laws of logic as having “unrestricted 
validity”, and so presumably, the universal quantifier ranges over 
everything, without restriction. 
In a paper delivered in 1939, but not published until 1976, Alonzo 
Church presents Schröder’s proposal as an anticipation of the simple 
theory of types. While the “elements” of a given set a will not 
subsume any classes which are also members of a, they may well 
subsume members of some other class b. Church proposes that we 
might see a and b as belonging to different types, where a is one type 
higher than b, as the elements of a are all classes containing members 
from the type of b. Frege's opposition to these restrictions, and his 
insistence that the laws of logic are unrestricted is seen by Church as 
a repetition of his view that all objects, including the “courses of 
______________ 
18 Frege (1895, pp. 339-340), discussed in Church (1976, p. 410). 
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values” which are Frege's sets, are of the same type, and fall within 
the range of the universal quantifier for objects.19  
Frege cites the same review of Schröder that Zermelo corrects in 
his letter from 1902. There is no evidence that Zermelo had read 
Frege's paper. At the least it appears that both had read Husserl's 
review, and reacted to it. Frege and Husserl had both identified the 
conflation of membership and the subset relation in Schröder’s 
notion of subsumption. Frege, however, also noticed, with Zermelo, 
that the point of the argument was to show that there is no universal 
set, or unrestricted “domain of discourse.” Indeed, as Church notes, 
Frege was to fall for the very sort of paradox that he accuses 
Schröder of trying to avoid, namely one that follows from assuming 
that there is a class of all things. It is tempting to speculate that 
Zermelo was aware of this dispute among the logicians about the 
“universe of discourse” and saw Cantor's idea of “absolute” infinities 
and the non-existence of a set of all cardinal numbers, as a clearer 
account of these same issues. As a consequence his diagonal 
argument, mathematically the same as Russell's, would also have 
seemed to him to be an anticipation of the use to which Russell put 
his argument. But, to continue the speculation, of course, one would 
have to accuse Zermelo of not seeing the simple theory of types as an 
alternative resolution to the set theoretic “antinomy” he had 
discovered. But, in fact, Zermelo and Russell seem to have been 
working in different worlds in set theory; Zermelo within the 
tradition of Cantor's set theory at Göttingen, and Russell, as always, 
refining and abandoning his own earlier views.  
There is no direct evidence that Russell studied Schröder’s 
argument, or saw in it either the idea of a contradiction in the notion 
of a set of all sets, or  an anticipation of the theory of types in its 
conclusion. Russell, did, however, study Frege's “A Critical 
Elucidation …” and made extensive notes on it as part of his 
preparation for adding “Appendix A: The Logical and Arithmetical 
Doctrines of Frege” to The Principles of Mathematics in the summer of 
1902, the same preparation that led to his letter to Frege.20 Nothing 
______________ 
19 Church argues that Frege's theory of “Stufe” of concepts and concepts 
that apply to first level concepts, etc., is not a theory of types of objects in the 
sense in which a genuine theory of simple types of classes is. 
20 See Linsky (2004a and 2004b). 
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relevant to this argument appears in the notes or in the ultimate 
appendix.  
However, there is evidence about Russell's general ideas about 
Schröder which comes from his interaction with Norbert Wiener in 
1913.21 In September 1913, Norbert Wiener, then just eighteen years 
old, visited Russell in Cambridge. He had just completed his PhD 
thesis at Harvard University, entitled A comparison between the treatment 
of the algebra of relatives by Schröder and that by Whitehead and Russell. Ivor 
Grattan-Guinness (1975) found several pages of comments by 
Russell and replies by Wiener, following a series of discussions the 
two had in September and October of that year. Wiener also attended 
Russell's lectures and some letters home report on the interchange.  
Russell wrote about the discussions as well, including this in a 
letter to Lucy Donnelly from 19 October 1913: 
At the end of Sept. an infant prodigy named Wiener, Ph.D. 
(Harvard), aged 18, turned up with his father... The youth 
has been flattered, and thinks himself God Almighty – 
there is a perpetual contest between him and me as to 
which is to do the teaching. (Grattan-Guinness 1975, 
p.105) 
Wiener brought a copy of his thesis, and he and Russell discussed 
it in a series of meetings, with an exchange of letters between 
meetings.22 The thesis and letters include a number of points about 
Schröder’s logic. The topic of the thesis was a defense of the merits 
of Schröder’s logic in comparison with Principia Mathematica. Two 
passages singled out by Grattan-Guinness are particularly relevant to 
the issues introduced above: 
______________ 
21 What follows is based on Grattan-Guinness (1975). 
22 This correspondence clarifies Wiener's often cited remark that Russell 
later was not particularly impressed with the reduction of relations to sets of 
ordered pairs that was Wiener's first published contribution to mathematics. 
(Wiener 1953, p. 191). In fact Russell had told Wiener that he did not 
identify relations with sets of “couples”, as was common in the tradition of 
Schröder and Peirce that Wiener was defending. See Grattan-Guinness, 
1975, p. 122. 
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A major point of contrast between Schröder's and 
Russell’s systems is that Schröderian individuals 
correspond to unit classes of Russellian individuals. Thus 
Schröder has no analogue to Russell's relation of 
membership of an individual to a class. But it does not 
matter, since Schröder has no need of such a relation, 
contrary to the opinion of Padoa that he conflated 
membership and inclusion, and to the opinion of Russell 
that all predecessors of Peano and Frege regarded 
membership as a special case of inclusion. (Grattan-
Guinness 1975, p. 124) 
Russell does not accept Wiener's claim that Schröder didn’t need 
the distinction between membership and subset. In one of his replies, 
he asks “Have you any evidence that Schröder knew that there was a 
difference between Peter and the class whose only member is Peter?” 
to which Wiener replies by repeating that Schröder is simply “not 
concerned” with that distinction. (Grattan-Guinness 1975, p. 128) 
Wiener credits Schröder with an anticipation of Russell’s theory of 
types in his discussion of the argument about the universal class 
under discussion above:  
No individual in a manifold can itself be composed of a 
collection of other individuals of that manifold. Instead, 
classes of individuals belong to the first ‘derived’ (abgeleitete) 
manifold of the ‘original’ (ursprüngliche) one. Classes of 
classes of individuals belong to the second derived 
manifold and so on. This creates a hierarchy of types 
corresponding to Russell's theory. The difference is that, 
while Russell can use more than one type at once, 
Schröder can speak only of one type at a time.  (Grattan-
Guinness 1975, p. 128) 
(This is the very same as Church’s analysis of Schröder's position, 
only expressed twenty-six years earlier.) There is no record of 
Russell's reaction to this part of the thesis, but it is clear that Russell 
had read in Wiener an expression of the view that Schröder had 
anticipated the theory of types in response to an argument that there 
cannot be a universal class to which everything belongs. It appears 
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that Russell did not think that he alone had seen that a diagonal 
argument like that in Cantor’s proof would establish that there can be 
no universal set of all sets. Although he studied and cited Zermelo's 
papers from 1908 as well, there is also no record of any response to 
the claim that others had anticipated the paradox. Schröder’s logic 
was so alien to Russell’s that it is understandable that he did not find 
anticipations of his own theory of types in it. Russell does not cite 
any sources for the notion of types that appears first in Appendix A 
of Principles of Mathematics, although clearly it was Frege's notion of 
Stufe or the hierarchy of concepts, concepts of concepts, etc. that 
must have inspired it.  
As with the anticipation of the theory of types, Russell was also 
close to Zermelo’s version of the paradox in Schröder's arguments, 
but clearly didn't arrive at it through that route.  Russell’s own 
paradox was the first paradox of predicates. He saw that the paradox 
of the set of all sets that are members of themselves was a result of 
similar thinking. His interest in the first paradox made him blind to 
the possibility of the second paradox raised by Schröder’s argument, 
which Zermelo had identified. But then Frege, who also read 
Schröder’s argument carefully didn’t see the argument either. Their 
thoughts were somewhere else. 
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